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1. INTRODUCTION 
One problem with an article of this kind is that the boundaries are not always clear. Some of the most con-
tested rights are those that do not derive 
from the Directive itself but from other legis-
lation or from principles of EU law (cases 
such as Teixeira, Ibrahim and Zambrano).1 
However, they are associated with free move-
ment rights as a whole and it would be artifi-
cial not to consider them in an analysis of this 
kind. While the article’s main focus is on the 
Directive, therefore, the free movement 
rights that originated outside the Directive 
are also considered as part of the discussion. 
The Directive applies to Union citizens 
and refers to Member States. The implement-
ing regulations refer to the EEA and to EEA 
nationals (which are to be interpreted as 
including Switzerland and Swiss nationals) 
even when applying rights that do not arise 
from the EU’s free movement legislation. 
However, as this article shows, rights are not 
* HELENA WRAY is Reader in Law at Middlesex Uni-
versity, London (H.Wray@mdx.ac.uk). Alison Hunter is 
a partner at Wesley Gryk Solicitors, London 
(alison@gryklaw.com). 
1 Teixeira v Lambeth LBC C-480/08); Harrow LBC v 
Ibrahim C-310/08; Ruiz Zambrano v ONEM C-34/09. 
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always correctly transposed or only after 
many years’ delay. It is therefore possible 
that EEA nationals do not have access to 
exactly the same rights as Union citizens, 
depending upon the precise position under 
the implementing legislation. Rather than 
try to distinguish on each occasion and to 
avoid juxtaposing terms inappropriately 
(EEA and Union Citizen, for example), this 
article will use the terminology of the Direc-
tive (Union Citizen and Member State) 
unless the context requires otherwise but 
readers should be aware that rights almost 
always apply also to EEA and Swiss nation-
als except where the rights outside the Direc-
tive have not been implemented through leg-
islation into the UK Law. 
2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
2.1. The UK and the EU 
The UK is known as an unenthusiastic 
member of the EU, a characteristic which has 
been linked to the relatively weak European 
identity of the British.2 This ambivalence has 
been historically true and shows little sign of 
2 LUEDTKE, A. (2005) ‘European Integration, Public 
Opinion and Immigration Policy: Testing the Impact of 
National Identity’ European Union Politics 6 (1) 83–112. 
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dissipating. The UK’s first attempt to join 
what was then the EEC in the early 1960s 
failed when it was vetoed by General de Gaulle 
and the UK did not become a member until 
1971, a decision endorsed by a national refer-
endum in 1975. Having joined later than the 
other major European economies, the UK had 
little influence over its foundational principles 
and priorities.3 Membership at that point 
meant an inevitable ceding of control with lit-
tle compensatory influence over the shaping of 
an institutional framework that was already 
well established. Thus, «the voluntary surren-
der of national sovereignty... created contro-
versy that recurs to some degree with every 
step to deepen integration».4 
Currently, this historical ambivalence is 
tending towards antipathy, particularly 
since the current Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat coalition took office in 2010. Opin-
ion polls consistently show a substantial sec-
tion of the population who wish to leave the 
EU and a majority in favour of reform 
(although they are not the only state to think 
in this way).5 The United Kingdom Indepen-
dence Party (UKIP), which supports with-
drawal from the EU and looks likely to win a 
large share of votes in the 2014 European 
elections, is pushing all the main parties 
towards positions of relative scepticism. The 
recent rise of UKIP is not the only driver 
however. The two main political parties (par-
ticularly the Conservative Party) have 
always contained some reluctant Europeans 
who have put pressure on their leaderships, 
although the latter have generally been in 
3 COOPER, R. (2012) ‘Britain in Europe’ International 
Affairs 1191-1203, 1192-4. 
4 BULMER, S. and BURCH, M. (2001) ‘The «Europeani-
sation» of central government: the UK and Germany in 
historical institutionalist perspective’ in Schneider, G. 
And Aspinwall,M. The rules of integration: Institutionalist 
approaches to the study of Europe (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press) 73-96, 82. 
5 See, for example, poll at: http://yougov.co.uk/ 
news/2014/05/21/voters-uk-and-europe-are-mood-
change/. 
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favour of maintaining membership if not, in 
the case of the Conservatives, further inte-
gration. The European Union Act 2011, 
which was sponsored by the Conservative 
Foreign Secretary in fulfilment of a Coalition 
government commitment, requires a nation-
al referendum prior to committing to any 
extension of EU competence. It also restates 
the principle of parliamentary sovereignty 
whereby directly effective EU law takes 
effect only by virtue of an Act of Parliament, 
an iteration whose legal rather than political 
necessity is doubtful. The Conservative Party 
has promised that, if it wins the 2015 elec-
tion, it will hold a referendum on continued 
membership by 2017 following a period of 
attempted renegotiation of the terms of mem-
bership. Both the Liberal Democrats, histori-
cally pro-European, and the Labour Party 
support a referendum if the government 
wishes to grant new powers to the EU. 
The EU has long been regarded by its crit-
ics as undermining parliamentary and 
national sovereignty. Recent discontent has 
centred on the exercise by EU nationals, par-
ticularly from accession states, of their rights 
of free movement which permit them to live, 
work and study in the UK and to access serv-
ices on a non-discriminatory basis. This is 
presented and perceived as an immigration 
issue, particularly where the entry of Union 
citizens from the poorer member states is 
concerned, and has been linked both to 
labour displacement, particularly at the bot-
tom end of the labour market, and benefits 
and health ‘tourism’ i.e. movement for the 
purposes of accessing these services.6 The 
extent to which these perceptions are fos-
tered by the institutional arrangements for 
the implementation and adjudication of free 
movement rights is discussed below but EU 
6 For a discussion of the treatment of ‘benefits 
tourists’, see Shaw, J., MILLER, N. And FLETCHER, M. (2013) 
Getting to grips with EU citizenship: Understanding the 
friction between UK immigration law and EU free move-
ment law Edinburgh Law School Citizenship Studies, 27. 
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free movement rights have also, in the recent 
period, been presented within political 
debate as a highly problematic immigration 
issue. Polls have shown strong support for 
the view that the free movement rules are 
damaging and should be restricted.7 There is 
some irony in this as it was the right wing 
neo-liberal government headed by Margaret 
Thatcher that originally promoted enlarge-
ment of the UK to include Eastern Europe.8 
The political salience of EU free movement 
can be dated to the 2004 accession of ten 
mainly Eastern European countries. Unlike 
almost all other member states, the UK did 
not impose transitional controls on access by 
these new EU citizens to the labour market, 
opting instead for a registration scheme for 
new workers from the eight Eastern Euro-
pean states which had the effect, in some cas-
es, of hindering access to welfare.9 More 
restrictive transitional controls were placed 
on A2 (Romanian and Bulgarian) nationals 
when these countries joined the EU at the 
beginning of 2007. 
Net migration from the EU in the eight 
years after 2004 is reported to have exceeded 
420,000.10 About 3.8% of the UK’s population 
consists of mobile Union citizens compared to 
an average within the EU of 2.7% although 
this is still a smaller proportion than in 
Spain, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Cyprus 
and Luxembourg.11 At the end of 2013, as 
transitional measures over Romanian and 
7 KELLNER, P. (2013) Putting Up with Europe YouGov 
available at: http://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/11/18/put-
ting-europe/). 
8 COOPER n.3, 1197. 
9 GLENNIE, A. and Pennington, J. (2013) In Transition: 
Romanian and Bulgarian Migration to the UK Institue of 
Public Policy research, 2; Zalewska v Department of 
Social Development [2008] UKHL 67. 
10 VARGAS-SILVA, C. (2014) Migration Flows of A8 and 
other EU Migrants to and from the UK 3rd revision Migra-
tion Observatory pp. 4-5 
11 ERNST & YOUNG (2014) Evaluation of the impact of 
the free movement of EU citizens at local level: Final 
Report (January 2014). 
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Bulgarian nationals came to an end, public 
concern and media coverage intensified dra-
matically, leading to some well-publicised 
new controls over welfare entitlements for 
new arrivals, discussed later in this article. It 
seems likely however that the numbers of A2 
nationals will be far fewer than the more 
alarmist predictions suggested.12 In May 
2014, it was reported that the number of A2 
nationals working in the UK decreased in the 
three months after transitional measures 
ended.13 There is also little evidence that 
these types of migrant make heavy demands 
upon public services although strains may 
arise in a few specific areas.14 Some problems 
around undercutting of wages have also been 
reported.15 However, EEA immigrants make, 
on balance, a net fiscal contribution to the 
UK and this has been particularly strong 
since 2001, so will include the post-2004 
arrivals.16 
2.2. Free movement rights, the UK 
government and immigration 
control 
If the UK is a largely compliant if unen-
thusiastic member state in most respects, 
there has always been particular resistance 
to EU intervention on matters which touch 
on immigration, or which are perceived to do 
so. The UK has never joined Schengen and 
has used its right to decide whether or not to 
opt into EU immigration legislation, agreed 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam, to avoid being 
12 Glennie and Pennington n.9, 8. 
13 ‘Number of Romanian and Bulgarian workers in 
UK falls’ Guardian 14th May 2014: http://www.the-
guardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/14/number-roman-
ian-bulgarian-workers-falls-border-controls 
14 Glennie and Pennington n.9, 17. 
15 Ibid, 17. 
16 Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2013) The Fiscal 
Effects of Immigration to the UK Discussion Paper Series 
CDP No 22/13 Centre for Research and Analysis of 
Migration, University College London. 
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bound by most of the EU’s immigration policy 
although it did opt into the first round (1999-
2004) of asylum legislation and has partici-
pated in measures on carriers’ liability, bio-
metric controls and readmission agree-
ments.17 However, it did not opt into the most 
recent round of asylum legislation nor the 
Family Reunification or Long Term Resi-
dents’ Directives.18 
Euro-scepticism is not necessarily the 
dominant motivation however. All the opt-
outs were decided not by the current more 
Euro-sceptic government but by the previous 
Labour government, which was broadly more 
favourable to Europe but was concerned with 
promoting selective immigration by the 
skilled and with checking irregular migra-
tion and asylum claims. Maintaining control 
over the UK’s physical borders has long been 
viewed as a critical aspect of national sover-
eignty, more than for other European states 
who share land borders with their neigh-
bours and for whom the question of legal 
presence may be more pressing than that of 
entry. The Labour government made instru-
mental use of EU competence where this was 
perceived to be in the national interest in pro-
tecting those borders.19 In fact, Geddes 
argues that even the right wing and combat-
ive Thatcher administration was not as 
opposed to immigration co-operation as 
might be supposed.20 In any event, since 
1999, «Britain has tended to participate in 
coercive measures that curtail the ability of 
migrants to enter the EU while opting out of 
protective measures such as the directives on 
17 GEDDES, A. (2005) ‘Getting the best of both 
worlds? Britain, the EU and migration policy’ Interna-
tional Affairs 81(4) 723-740, 734-735. 
18 For a discussion of the asylum opt-outs, see Ste-
fanelli , J. (2011) ‘Whose rule of law? An analysis of the 
UK’s decision not to opt-in to the EU Asylum Procedures 
and Reception Conditions Directives’ International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 60(4) 1055-1064, 1056-
1061. 
19 Geddes n. 17. 
20 Geddes n. 17, 733. 
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family reunion and the rights of long-term 
residents that to some extent give rights to 
migrants and third-country nationals».21 
Free movement rights are not, them-
selves, immigration laws but are designed to 
give full effect to the purposes of the EU. 
They thus tend to be interpreted expansively 
by the Court of Justice at least when there is 
a genuine cross-border element involved and 
they cut across national immigration con-
trols. Indeed, interaction with national law is 
anticipated in the Directive, in respect of, for 
example, other family members or unmar-
ried partners (article 3(2)). Free movement 
rights, particularly those involving third 
country nationals (TCN) family members, 
are generally associated with immigration 
rather than with economic or citizenship 
questions and are seen as interfering in 
national sovereignty in this respect. 
For many years, migration from the EU 
was not usually regarded as problematic 
even though rules on questions such as fami-
ly reunification, financial standing and 
access to services were much more liberal 
than the national regime. It has however 
been politicised in recent years. The Conserv-
ative Party manifesto in the 2010 general 
election promised to reduce net migration22, 
including from the EU, from the ‘hundreds’ to 
the ‘tens’ of thousands23. Another back-
ground feature has been the growing number 
of migrants, both EU citizens and third coun-
try nationals (TCNs), entering as the family 
members of EU citizens including, in some 
cases, British citizens. The 1999 Court of Jus-
tice decision in Surinder Singh found that 
EU citizens exercising their free movement 
rights had the right to family reunification 
21 Geddes n. 17, 734. 
22 ‘Annual net migration to UK was 212,000 in final 
quarter of 2013’ The Guardian 22nd May 2014. 
23 SYMONDS, S. (2011) ‘The Numbers Game’ Journal 
of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law 26(2), 138-
155. 
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under EU law not only in the state to which 
they moved but after returning to their own 
member state.24 This opened a route by which 
some British citizens could bypass restrictive 
national rules and procure the admission of 
third country national family members by 
exercising their rights in another member 
state for a few months before returning to the 
UK. The ‘Surinder Singh route’ has become 
part of the common knowledge base for fami-
lies seeking to be reunited in the UK in the 
face of increasingly restrictive national laws 
and it even has several Facebook groups.25 
Even without the Surinder Singh decision, 
the family reunification rights of EU citizens 
were becoming problematic, particularly as 
the EU expanded. A particular issue is the 
suspicion that the EU regime is not suffi-
ciently robust in preventing sham marriages, 
themselves a recurring theme in British 
immigration law,26 and, after the Metock 
decision in 2008, the UK made largely unsuc-
cessful attempts to obtain a wider interpreta-
tion of an abuse of rights. While national laws 
require parties to the marriage to establish 
that the marriage is genuine, the burden of 
proof in EU cases is on the government and 
individual consideration must be given to 
each claim. There have been several reports 
of sham marriages involving EU citizens, and 
the EU regime has been described by politi-
cians as a ‘loophole’.27 However, it is not clear 
whether the concern is that the marriages 
are not genuine or that these are migrants 
24 R. v Immigration Appeal Tribunal Ex p. SSHD 
C370/90. 
25 See, for example, https://www.facebook.com/ 
groups/alison48amanda48/ 
26 Wray, H. (2006) ‘An Ideal Husband? Marriages of 
Convenience, Moral gatekeeping and Immigration to 
the UK’ European Journal of Migration and Law, 
8(Autumn) 303-320; UK European Migration Network 
National Contact Point (2012) Misuse of the right to fam-
ily reunification: Marriages of convenience and false dec-
larations of parenthood , Home Office. 
27 UK European Migration Network National Con-
tact Point n. 16, 16; Wray n.16, 316. 
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who would not be permitted to enter under 
national laws; sometimes the issues seem to 
be conflated. For example, in 2011, visa offi-
cers were asked to report applications made 
overseas for a family permit where there 
were concerns about abuse. 276 applications 
(just under 2% of total applications) were 
referred, of which 78 were found to have 
‘adverse immigration histories’ and 19 had 
criminal histories while «[i]n some cases 
there were also concerns about the authentic-
ity of the relationship. The government con-
cluded that: «Whilst these numbers are 
small, it suggests that some migrants are 
abusing the Free Movement Directive in 
order to gain legitimate entry to the UK 
which would not otherwise be possible due to 
their adverse immigration history».28 
While not the only motive (another may 
have been to inhibit article 8 claims based on 
marriage), initiatives such as the former cer-
tificates of approval scheme, which required 
migrants to obtain permission to marry from 
the government (routinely refused to irregu-
lar and short-term migrants), and the new 
pre-marriage investigations established by 
the Immigration Act 2014 aim to prevent 
marriages between EU citizens and third 
country nationals that, once they have taken 
place, give rise to residence rights.29 A back-
ground feature in the UK is the presence of a 
large body of irregular migrants (estimated 
at about 600,000).30 Although the UK’s courts 
have forced the government to modify its 
stance to some degree, the national rules 
require such migrants to leave the country 
before they can regularise their position on 
the basis of marriage, to meet other demand-
ing criteria, for example, in respect of their 
28 UK European Migration Network National Con-
tact Point Ibid, 25. 
29 Wray n. 26; Immigration Act 2014. 
30 GORDON, I., SCANLON, K., TRAVERS, T. and WHITE-
HEAD, C (2009) Economic Impact on the London and UK 
Economy of an Earned Regularisation of Irregular 
Migrants to the UK, Greater London Authority. 
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financial position and to pass government-
imposed tests to detect sham marriages.31 
None of this can be required of the spouses of 
EU citizens and the easiest way to avoid their 
residence is to prevent the marriage from 
taking place. Hence the emphasis in both the 
certificates of approval scheme and its suc-
cessor is on testing the marriage and pro-
hibiting it from taking place if it does not pass 
these tests. 
The ability of TCN family members in gen-
eral, not just spouses, to use EU law as the 
basis of a claim to remain has also started to 
be seen as problematic. While, as mentioned 
above, the UK’s record on implementation of 
EU law has historically been fairly good, in 
recent years, implementation of some Court 
of Justice jurisprudence on free movement 
and third country family members has been 
tardy and reluctant, an issue discussed below 
in the section on implementing legislation. 
Some other flashpoints have emerged. One is 
access to benefits and services. In order to 
minimise welfare claims by newly arrived 
intra-EU migrants, the government applies a 
‘habitual residence’ criterion and this has 
caused tension between the UK and the Com-
mission. Welfare claimants must show both 
that they are habitually resident in the UK 
and that they have the right to reside in the 
UK. The first part of the test is uncontrover-
sial as it applies both to UK citizens and 
Union citizens. The second part however can-
not be applied to UK citizens who have an 
unconditional right to live in the UK while 
Union citizens must show that they are exer-
cising their free movement rights as a work-
er, self-employed, student or self-sufficient 
Union citizen in order to claim. It is thus 
regarded as discriminatory. In 2011, the 
European Commission sent a reasoned opin-
ion to the UK government concerning the test 
31 For a discussion of the UK courts and family 
migration, see Wray, H. (2013) ‘Greater than the sum of 
their parts: UK Supreme Court Decisions on Family 
Migration’ Public Law 2013 (October) 838-860. 
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a n d ,  i n  M a y  2 0 1 3 ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
announced that it was making a referral to 
the Court of Justice for infringement pro-
ceedings (the domestic jurisprudence is dis-
cussed below). This decision was widely 
reported in the British media as a measure 
that would hinder the UK’s battle against 
‘benefits tourism’.32 This step did not cause 
the government to reconsider; it has intro-
duced and is planning new restrictions on 
access to benefits by Union citizens, dis-
cussed below, some of which may not conform 
to EU law. 
There is also the related question of the 
status of those who are deemed to fall outside 
the ambit of free movement rights because 
they are not working, studying or self-suffi-
cient. These individuals may or may not have 
applied for and been refused benefits or social 
housing and may come to the attention of the 
authorities because they are homeless and 
sleeping rough or for another reason. In 2010, 
the government piloted a scheme that 
attempted to expel EEA nationals who were 
sleeping rough, usually from Central or East-
ern Europe. This was regarded by many as 
unlawful and, in any event, was largely 
pointless as the individual concerned had the 
right to re-enter the UK (although, as dis-
cussed below, the government has now taken 
steps to limit their re-entry).33 Another area 
of tension is the deportation of foreign nation-
als who have committed criminal offences 
(foreign national prisoners or FNPs). As 
Shaw et al point out, transposition of Direc-
tive 2004/38, with its layered protection for 
criminal EU citizens, coincided with an 
intensification by government of efforts to 
deport FNPs. While those with rights under 
EU law were excluded from the rigour of the 
domestic law, public and even parliamentary 
32 Social security benefits: Commission refers UK to 
Court for incorrect application of EU social security safe-
guards European Commission Press Release 30th May 
2013; Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 27-28. 
33 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 31-33. 
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discourse did not usually make the distinc- recent years where free movement rights are 
tion. All FNPs who meet the criteria in concerned.37 
national law are considered for deportation, 
including Union citizens who are treated as 
potentially eligible for deportation although 
the government had to abandon the pre-
sumption that all EEA nationals who had 
served sentences of 24 months or more should 
be deported.34 Nonetheless, they are liable to 
be placed in immigration detention while 
their position is investigated at the end of 
their sentence.35 
2.3. The institutional context 
A contributory factor to the association of 
free movement rights with immigration is 
their institutional and legal framework. 
Membership of the EU required profound 
adaptation within government and commen-
tators noted that the UK’s centralised system 
of government, majoritarian electoral sys-
tem, common law legal system and adversar-
ial politics were not in tune with EU models 
of multi-levelled governance, consensus 
building and legal regulation drawn from civ-
il law traditions. Broader circumstances such 
as weak public support for the EU and politi-
cal differences with key EU partners also had 
a role.36 However, while detailed considera-
tion of policy was delegated to the relevant 
ministry, responsibility for legal aspects lay 
with the government’s legal office, the Trea-
sury Solicitor’s Department. Legal advisors 
in this Department, which was regarded as a 
branch of the Cabinet Office and therefore 
highly authoritative, oversaw transposition 
and implementation of EC legislation across 
government, which may explain why the UK 
record on this has historically been good com-
pared to other major member states although 
this has not been always been the case in 
34 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 30.
 
35 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 29-30.
 
36 Bulmer and Burch n.4. 
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As regards the implementation of free 
movement rights, the Strategy, Immigration 
and International Group sits within the 
Home Office, undertakes strategy and policy 
work and liaises with other departments and 
external bodies including the European Com-
mission. There is also coordination between 
departments with responsibilities related to 
free movement rights, for example, the 
Department of Work and Pensions (welfare 
entitlements) and the Department for Com-
munities and Local Government (housing 
policy).38 However, recognition of the right to 
exercise free movement rights in individual 
cases has always been determined by the 
immigration service (although welfare agen-
cies decide on entitlement to services). 
Between 2008 and 2013, immigration func-
tions were carried out by the United King-
dom Border Agency (UKBA), an executive 
agency supervised by the Home Office. 
Responsibility for implementation of free 
movement rights was spread across all areas 
of operations. Visa staff decided requests for 
EEA family permits, border staff oversaw 
admissions into the UK and the immigration 
team handled requests for registration cer-
tificates, residence cards and authorisations 
for workers from accession states.39 Finally, 
the criminality and detention team dealt 
with the deportation of EEA nationals and 
their family members (although its functions 
were subsumed into a new Home Office 
organisation, Border Force, in 2012). In 2013, 
following wide criticism of its poor service, 
UKBA lost its executive agency status and its 
work was returned to the direct control of the 
Home Office through a new organisation, UK 
37 Bulmer and Burch n.4, 868; Perkins, R. and NEU-
MAYER, R. (2007) ‘Do Membership Benefits Buy Regula-
tory Compliance? An Empirical Analysis of EU Directives 
1978-99’ European Union Politics 8(2) 180-206, 183. 
38 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 14. 
39 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 14-15. 
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Visas and Immigration, but the distribution 
of responsibilities was unchanged. In all cas-
es, staff spend the majority of their time on 
questions of national immigration control 
and EU free movement rights would only be a 
small proportion of their work load. It is easy 
to see how, in that environment, a permissive 
immigration culture, in which applicants are 
regarded as asking to be excepted from the 
usual norms of control, rather than a facilita-
tive free movement culture would predomi-
nate. Even if staff are in a unit devoted to EU 
applications, they may have spent their pre-
vious career working in national immigration 
and be inculcated with the culture of that 
environment. Shaw et al found, in their study 
of implementation, that immigration officers 
quite often treat free movement applications 
as if they were immigration applications and 
subject to the standards of documentary 
proof and credibility judgments associated 
with immigration control.40 Refusal rates 
have been climbing steadily since at least 
2006. 41 
Another institutional factor is the legal 
structure of control. The main immigration 
legislation is the Immigration Act 1971. 
S.3(1) provides that only British citizens (and 
a few Commonwealth citizens who, for histor-
ical reasons, have a ‘right of abode’) may 
enter the UK without leave. An exception to 
this is made in the Immigration Act 1988, 
s.7(1), which provides that leave is not 
required by a person who is entitled to enter 
by virtue of an enforceable EU right. This is 
legally correct but the reference to ‘enforce-
able EU rights’ and the failure to amend the 
main legislation suggest that it is an excep-
tional state of affairs. There is no other pri-
mary legislation which explicitly gives force 
to free movement rights, notably the right 
not only to enter the UK but to live there. Sec-
40 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 43-45, 48-9. 
41 UK European Migration Network National Con-
tact Point n.16, 23, Table 5; Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 
6, 7-8. 
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ondary implementing legislation is called the 
‘Immigration (European Economic Area) 
Regulations’, even though the power to make 
them derives primarily from the European 
Communities Act 1972, reinforcing the 
impression that free movement rights are an 
exception carved out of the immigration sys-
tem rather than a freestanding system of civ-
il entitlements. As well as this primary and 
secondary legislation, there is guidance to 
officials, the European Casework Instruc-
tions, discussed further below and which may 
be accessed via the UK Visas and Immigra-
tion website.42 
Appeals against refusal of registration cer-
tificates or residence cards, refusal of admis-
sion, and deportation (but not refusal of wel-
fare entitlements)are brought in the Immigra-
tion and Asylum Chamber of the First Tier 
Tribunal in the first instance and from there 
to the Upper Tribunal, still the Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber. Tribunal members are 
all legally trained and there are many good 
quality decisions although the standard is not 
consistently high. As discussed below, howev-
er, the defensive and literal approach associat-
ed with domestic immigration law sometimes 
seeps into the decisions on free movement 
rights.43 Thus, there may be an excessive 
emphasis on evidential questions or on a past 
immigration history of non-compliance 
although the Upper Tribunal and higher 
courts have corrected some of the poor deci-
sions in that regard.44 Where the UK’s imple-
menting legislation does not reflect the Court 
of Justice jurisprudence, there is a tendency to 
rely only on the domestic law.45 While some of 
this complex jurisprudence may be difficult to 
assimilate, inadequate or delayed guidance 
and rule amendments have consequences for 
decision-makers and judges as well as individ-
42 https://www.gov.uk/immigration-operational-
guidance/european-casework-instructions. 
43 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 43-45. 
44 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 43-6. 
45 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 39-40. 
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uals who, in the absence of specialised advice, 
may not appreciate that they have rights that 
are not apparent from the face of the regula-
tions. Presenting officers who represent the 
government, meanwhile, may find it hard to 
present a consistent line of argument.46 
It has been suggested that one govern-
ment tactic is to put forward legal arguments 
that might appeal to a domestic court but not 
to the Court of Justice, in the knowledge that 
it may be many years before the issue is 
determined at the European level.47 While 
any court or tribunal may make a reference 
for a preliminary ruling from the Court of 
Justice under article 276 TFEU, until recent-
ly, the asylum and immigration judiciary had 
been instructed in a practice note to refrain 
from making references, leaving the decision 
to the President of the Tribunal, thus dis-
couraging independent engagement with EU 
law by the Tribunal. Even now, most refer-
ences are from the Upper Tribunal.48 
The costs associated with bringing appeals 
are considerable. A fee of £80 for a decision on 
the papers and £140 for a hearing is payable 
(unless the appeal is against removal or there 
are exceptional circumstances). Legal repre-
sentation will cost much more and, since 
April 2013, legal aid is no longer available for 
EEA appeals except for discrimination and 
domestic violence related claims or, excep-
tionally, if failure to provide legal aid would 
itself breach EU law. From 1st April until 
31st December 2013, 187 applications were 
made for exceptional funding in respect of the 
entire immigration system and 3 were grant-
ed so the likelihood of an EEA exceptional 
claim succeeding is minimal.49 The costs con-
46 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 49-50.
 
47 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 49.
 
48 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 15.
 
49 Ministry of Justice (2014) Legal Aid Exceptional
 
Case Funding Application and Determination Statistics: 1 
April to 31 December 2013 Ministry of Justice Statistics 
Release. 
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nected with bringing a case to the Court of 
Appeal or the Supreme Court are prohibitive 
for almost all private individuals and the 
demise of legal aid in this area makes it less 
likely that decisions will be challenged at the 
highest level. This makes the question of the 
quality of Tribunal decisions even more 
important. 
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN 
FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS INTO 
UK LAW 
3.1. The Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations 2006 
In the United Kingdom, the Directive has 
been implemented by the Immigration (EEA) 
Regulations 2006, as amended.50 The Direc-
tives that were repealed by Directive 
2004/38/EC had been implemented by the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) Reg-
ulations 2000, as amended.51 Those Regula-
tions were repealed and replaced in full by 
the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
Regulations 2006. 
The 2006 Regulations are made under Sec-
tion 2 (2) of the European Communities Act 
1972 and Section 109 of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Under 
the statute, the regulations become law auto-
matically unless there is an objection either 
from the House of Commons or the House of 
Lords; in other words, they do not need to be 
affirmed or actively approved by Parliament. 
The Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2006 
were laid before Parliament on 30 March 
2006 and would have been revoked if either 
House of Parliament had passed a resolution 
to annul them within forty days. So, despite 
50 The Immigration (European Economic Area) Reg-
ulations 2006, (SI 2006/1003). 
51 Directive 67/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC. 
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the significant impact these Regulations 
have on an acutely political topic, they were 
not actively scrutinised by Parliament. 
As required by Directive 2004/38, the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) Reg-
ulations came into force on 30 April 2006. The 
new Regulations followed the structure that 
had been used in the 2000 Regulations. In 
part 1, there are definitions covering the cat-
egories of persons who are referred to in the 
Directive. Part 2 sets out the free movement 
rights conferred on EEA nationals. Part 3 
provides for the provision of residence docu-
mentation, part 4 for the exclusion and 
removal of EEA nationals, part 5 contains 
procedural issues on admission and part 6 
sets out appeal rights in relation to decisions 
taken under these Regulations. The Regula-
tions apply to all EEA nationals (the nation-
als of all EU states plus Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein) and Swiss nationals who are 
accorded the same rights as EEA nationals, 
even though the Swiss free movement agree-
ment was not automatically amended by the 
Directive. This was a conscious decision to 
ensure uniformity for all EEA and Swiss 
nationals. 
3.2. Amendments to the Regulations 
Since initial implementation, the Regula-
tions have been amended on six occasions; in 
2009, 2011, twice in 2012 and twice again in 
2013.52 This was done by way of amending 
regulations laid before Parliament in the 
same fashion as the original Regulations. 
3.2.1. The 2009 amendments 
The 2009 Amendment Regulations provid-
ed a power to the Secretary of State to 
exclude EEA nationals from the United King-
52 SI 2009/1117; SI 2011/1247; SI 2012/1547; SI 
2012/2560; SI 2013/1391 and SI 2013/3032. 
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dom in certain circumstances, introduced a 
power to detain EEA nationals for the pur-
pose of examining whether they were exercis-
ing Treaty rights and made a few amend-
ments to tidy up the 2006 Regulations. 
Although initially the regulations appeared 
to be making the use of forms compulsory, 
this was soon clarified, as the Home Office 
confirmed that valid applications need not be 
made on a form.53 Overall they were uncon-
troversial and were considered as a tidying 
up exercise. 
3.2.2. The 2011 amendments 
The 2011 amendments gave effect to the 
Metock judgment which had been decided in 
July 2008. The slow implementation of 
Metock exemplifies the reluctance of the 
British government to adopt wholeheartedly 
principles of EU law where these are per-
ceived to undermine national controls. The 
2006 Regulations had interpreted rights very 
narrowly, imposing rules equivalent to 
national laws on those who entered the UK 
from outside the EU. This was consistent 
with the decision in Akrich that a non EU 
spouse of an EU worker may not avail him-
self of freedom of movement rights if he or she 
has been residing in the EU unlawfully.54 
The Home Office thus insisted that the privi-
leges of European free movement law could 
only extend to those who had first joined the 
EEA national in another EEA country (e.g. 
the EEA national’s home country) according 
to the immigration laws of that country.55 
Third county nationals who were not lawfully 
resident and who had not accompanied or 
joined the EEA citizen in the United King-
dom were unable to benefit from the Regula-
tions. This particularly affected TCNs who 
53 Letter dated 9 June 2008 from ILPA to the EEA 
team at the Home Office. 
54 SSHD v Akrich C-109/01. 
55 ILPA information sheet – Families of EEA Nationals 
dated 5 August 2008. 
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entered the United Kingdom either lawfully 
or illegally and then married there; they had 
to comply with the far more restrictive tests 
required in domestic law, including stringent 
maintenance and accommodation require-
ments. TCNs who were irregular migrants 
were expected to return to their home coun-
tries and apply for entry clearance again 
under the far more stringent domestic rules. 
This compared unfavourably with the posi-
tion under the 2000 Regulations which had 
required that, to enter or remain in another 
Member State as the spouse of an EU citizen, 
all that was needed was to show marriage (by 
providing a marriage certificate) and that the 
EU citizen was exercising a Treaty right. 
The Metock decision made it clear that the 
more restrictive 2006 rules were incompati-
ble with EU law. After the decision, the Irish 
government took four days to bring its legis-
lation into line with the judgment. The Unit-
ed Kingdom took nearly three years.  
Although the principle was fully implement-
ed in guidance in November 2008, the Immi-
gration (EEA) Regulations 2006 remained 
unamended until the 2011 amendments. 
This reluctance to change the Regulations 
meant that, for nearly three years, the Regu-
lations provided that national immigration 
rules applied to family reunification by EU 
citizens in a far wider range of circumstances 
than permitted by EU law. The Home Office 
rationalised its failure to change the regula-
tions by saying that this was not necessary 
for the judgment to have effect in the UK and 
they had been compliant since November 
2008. They dismissed concerns about confu-
sion to applicants and caseworkers by saying 
that direct family members were not disad-
vantaged as the Home Office was administra-
tively compliant. This ignores the difficulty 
that such family members had in ascertain-
ing what the correct rules were. The next bul-
let point in the document containing this 
exchange stated utterly out of context: ‘We 
continue to take a robust approach to abuse 
of marriage and family reunification issues 
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by EEA nationals, as well as to abuse of all 
areas of free movement’ indicating the pre-
dominant concerns of the Home Office.56 
3.2.3. The first 2012 amendments 
The first set of amendments passed in 
2012 were primarily made to incorporate 
CJEU jurisprudence and, again, there was 
considerable delay between decisions being 
made and amendment.57 The judgments 
incorporated by the 2012 amendments 
included Chen, which had been decided in 
2004, an eight year gap and an extreme 
example of delay in implementation.58 Under 
these amendments, primary carers of self 
sufficient EU citizen children under 18 were 
finally provided with rights of entry to, and 
residence in, the United Kingdom where the 
denial of the right would prevent the EU citi-
zen child from exercising their own right of 
residence.59 This followed an Upper Tribunal 
case suggesting that there is not just a right 
under European law to remain in the UK, 
subject to meeting the criteria set out in 
Chen, but also to enter the United Kingdom. 
It stated explicitly that a family permit 
(rather than entry clearance under domestic 
law provisions) was the appropriate way to 
deal with such an application.60 This finally 
led to the lifting of the restrictions on work-
ing to which parents granted under the Chen 
provisions in domestic law had been subject 
and made UK law compatible with Article 23 
of the Directive. 
56 International Group, UK Border Agency note on 
Metock Ruling of 5 November 2009. 
5 7  The  Immig ra t ion  ( Eu ropean  Economic  
Area)(Amendment) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/1547). 
58 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-200/02. 
59 Explanatory Note to Immigration (EEA) (Amend-
ment) Regulations 2012/1547. 
60 M (Chen Parents: source of rights) Ivory Coast 
[2010]UKUT 227 (IAC). 
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The second striking feature of these 
amendments, and which has been seen on 
many other occasions, is a very narrow inter-
pretation of the jurisprudence which pays lit-
tle regard to the policy behind a decision. The 
teleological approach often adopted by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union fre-
quently does not lend itself to moulding into 
strict statutory laws which try to minimise 
discretion and room for interpretation. The 
approach taken in the United Kingdom has 
been to take a very literal and often restric-
tive view of the case law with little acknowl-
edgement of the underlying principle of the 
case or regard for previously established 
principles in European law. 
The cases of Ibrahim and Teixeira are on 
point. The 2012 amendments inserted Regu-
lation 15A entitled ‘Derivative Right of Resi-
dence’, which aims to implement the deci-
sions in those cases, into the 2006 Regula-
tions. The rights, as implemented by the 2012 
amendments, do not lead to permanent resi-
dence and are wholly dependent on the status 
of the person for whom the third country 
national is caring.61 The narrowness of the 
drafting means that there is little room for 
variations on a factual basis from the original 
cases and this invariably leads to more litiga-
tion. For example, by the time of implemen-
tation, the Tribunal had already found that a 
worker, for this purpose, does not include a 
job seeker and that the derived right arises 
only if the parent is in work when the child 
begins education. This was not in accordance 
with the CJEU judgment in Texeira in which 
it is apparent that rights may arise even if 
the parent’s work ceases before education 
begins. In an appeal from the Tribunal deci-
sion, the Court of Appeal did not rule on the 
latter point and held that the definition of 
worker, for the purposes of Regulation 
492/2011, might be more demanding than 
61 Although this follows the CJEU’s position in para-
graph 48 of Alarape, C-529/11. 
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under Directive 2004/38.62 Later, the Tri-
bunal in Ahmed found that a derivative right 
does exist, even if the EEA national was not 
in work when the child started education.63 
The delay in implementing the judgment and 
the determination to interpret it as narrowly 
as possible with no regard to the conse-
quences and the more general principles of 
European law thus leads to uncertainty and 
confusion. The focus on restriction rather 
than rights can also clearly be seen by the 
specific exclusion in the definition of educa-
tion of ‘nursery education’. 
Similarly, the definition of ‘EEA national’ 
was amended in these regulations in response 
to McCarthy64 to mean only ‘a national of an 
EEA state who is not also a British citizen’ so 
that nationals with dual EEA and British citi-
zenship cannot benefit from EU law when try-
ing to bring their family members to the Unit-
ed Kingdom. This is particularly harsh when 
dual nationals are unable to fulfil domestic 
rules but are exercising a Treaty right in the 
United Kingdom and is likely at some point to 
lead to absurd situations. For example, a dual 
German/UK national worked in the UK before 
moving to Germany for work where he marries 
a TCN. If he wants to return to the UK, he 
would be unable to benefit from the EEA Reg-
ulations which ostensibly embody the 
Surinder Singh principle as he would have 
been residing and working in Germany as a 
German national. He would have to rely on the 
far more stringent domestic provisions to bring 
his spouse to the United Kingdom, arguably in 
contravention of his EU law rights. 
3.2.4. The second 2012 amendments 
Given the delay in amending the Regula-
tions to make them compliant with Metock 
62 MDB (Italy) v SSHD [2013] Civ 1015. 
63 Ahmed (Amos; Zambrano; Reg 15A(3)© 2006 EEA 
regs [2013]UKUT 00089 (IAC)). 
64 McCarthy v SSHD C-126/11. 
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and Chen, it was no surprise to find that the 
principles set out in the case of Zambrano 
which was decided in March 2011 were not 
included in the first round of 2012 amend-
ments. They were however incorporated in 
the second set of 2012 amendments.65 As with 
Metock, the Home Office had issued guidance 
on how they were implementing the case 
although it was not readily available. The 
implementation in the Regulations is in fact 
less prescriptive then the original policy 
guidance and is considered a fair interpreta-
tion of the case. 
In relation to extended family members 
the Secretary of State finally accepted follow-
ing Rahmanthat, to benefit from the provi-
sions on ‘other family members’, the appli-
cant need not have been residing with the 
European national in another member state 
before coming to the United Kingdom.66 
There was however a drastic curtailment of 
the right of appeal for durable partners who 
cannot produce ‘sufficient evidence to satisfy 
the Secretary of State that he is in a relation-
ship with the EEA national’.67 In practice, 
this power does not appear to be widely used 
and could no doubt be subject to a lawfulness 
challenge given its undoubted limitation on a 
right of appeal. 
3.2.5. The first 2013 amendments 
A more controversial issue was fee charg-
ing, which was introduced through the first 
set of 2013 regulations which came into force 
on 1 July 2013. These changed the require-
ment in the 2006 Regulations for documenta-
tion to be issued free of charge. Although 
applications made from outside the United 
Kingdom remain free, those made inside the 
65 Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amend-
ment) (No. 2) Regulations SI 2012/2560. 
66 Rahman and others C-83-11. 
67 Regulation 26(2A) Immigration (EEA) Regulations 
2006, as amended. 
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United Kingdom now carry a charge of £55. It 
is unclear which document the Home Office 
has taken as a comparator for setting this fee, 
as required in the Directive, given that there 
is no obligation on United Kingdom citizens 
to hold any type of identity document.68 The 
fee does not correspond to the fee for a pass-
port which is currently set at £72.50 (roughly 
89 Euros) or a driving licence, set at £50 
(roughly 61 Euros.). 
3.2.6. The second 2013 amendments 
These are more far-reaching as they try to 
restrict the meaning of worker and jobseeker. 
They set out how long somebody can be 
deemed to be a ‘jobseeker’ both on their initial 
entry to the country and once they have 
worked in the United Kingdom. In summary, 
they only allow a person to remain a jobseek-
er for longer than six months if they are able 
to provide ‘compelling evidence of seeking 
work and having a genuine chance of being 
engaged’. If such obligations are greater than 
those imposed on British nationals who are 
registered job seekers and lead to disadvan-
tages such as reduced access to benefits, this 
would be incompatible with Article 7(3)(b) of 
the Directive. In respect of those who have 
worked less than a year and Article 7(3)(c) of 
the Directive, the same point would apply in 
relation to the new requirement to show evi-
dence of seeking work and having a genuine 
chance of being engaged. 
The amendments also enable the United 
Kingdom to partly implement Article 10 of 
the Directive which requires family members 
of Union citizens in possession of a valid resi-
dence card (irrespective of where it was 
issued) to be exempt from the requirement to 
obtain a further visa. The United Kingdom 
had previously not applied this exemption to 
the third country nationals holding a resi-
68 Article 25(2) Directive 2004/38. 
REVISTA DEL MINISTERIO DE EMPLEO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 110 75 
Q_`aPU[_ 
dence card from any Member State. The 
restriction has been lifted on Germany and 
Estonia based apparently on the procedures 
of these countries as established in a survey 
of Member States’ practices on residence 
cards carried out by the Secretary of State 
when defending a judicial review on this 
question.69 The Secretary of State had not 
disputed that the 2006 Regulations did not 
fully implement the Directive but argued 
that non-implementation was justified by 
Article 1 of the Frontiers Protocol and as a 
necessary measure under Article 35 of the 
Directive.70 The arguments were that there 
were no uniform format for residence cards, 
no minimum security features, they were not 
in English, they were susceptible to forgery 
and they could be confused with other types 
of residence permits. One has to presume 
that the partial removal of the restriction is 
an attempt to dissuade the Commission from 
further pursuing infringement proceedings 
which had been instigated against the United 
Kingdom. 71 
Three further amendments deal with the 
perceived abuse of rights: firstly, there are 
provisions which enable the Secretary of 
State to call applicants for interview and pro-
vide that non attendance can be taken into 
consideration at the time of making a deci-
sion (although it should not be the sole fac-
tor).72 Secondly, it provides for a prohibition 
69 McCarthy, Rodriguez and Rodriguez v SSHD 
[2012]EWHC 3368 (Admin). 
70 Paragraph 62(2) ibid. 
71 Free movement: Commission asks the UK to 
uphold EU citizens’ rights, European Commission press 
release, IP12/417. For further discussion on this ques-
tion, see the Advocate General’s opinion in McCarthy 
and others v SSHD C-202/13. According to Advocate 
General Szpunar, a Member State may not make a third-
country national’s right of entry subject to the prior 
obtaining of a visa, when he already holds a ‘Residence 
card of a family member of a Union citizen’ issued by 
another Member State 
72 Regulation 20B, The Immigration (EEA) Regula-
tions 2006, as amended; Explanatory Memorandum for 
SI 2013/3032. 
M
IN
IT
ER
IO
 D
E 
EM
PL
EO
 Y
 S
EG
UR
ID
AD
 S
O
CI
AL
on people returning to the United Kingdom if 
they have been removed from the UK during 
the previous twelve months for not having 
the right to reside and they cannot demon-
strate that they have a right to reside beyond 
the three months usually allowed on entry, a 
provision whose compliance with EU law is 
doubtful. 
Thirdly, the Secretary of State has circum-
scribed the effects of Surinder Singh in the 
Regulations by imposing three conditions for 
the exercise of Surinder Singh rights. Firstly, 
the British citizen must have been a worker 
or self-employed in the host Member State. 
This has already been declared incorrect in 
the case of O&B which states clearly that the 
right to take home one’s family members 
applies to all categories of EU citizens, not 
just workers or the self employed.73 Secondly, 
the amended Regulations state that the 
British citizen must be living with his or her 
family members in the host Member State or 
have been living together before the British 
citizen returns to the UK. This again appears 
to be in contradiction to established case law 
which has consistently stated that families 
do not have to live together.74 Thirdly, the 
Regulations require a British citizen to have 
‘transferred the centre of his or her life’75 to 
another member state in order to acquire a 
right of residence for a non-EEA family mem-
ber in the United Kingdom upon their return. 
Relevant factors include the period of resi-
dence in the member state, the location of the 
person’s principal residence and the degree of 
integration. The Explanatory Note to the 
amending regulations goes on to state: ‘These 
changes are to ensure that a British citizen 
engages in a genuine and effective use of the 
rights conferred by Directive 2004/38/EC 
before a right to reside in the United King-
dom is conferred on a non-EEA family mem-
73 C-456/12, 12 March 2014. 
74 Diatta v Land Berlin C-267/83. 
75 Regulation 9 , The Immigration (EEA) Regulations 
2006, as amended. 
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ber.’ The O&B case appears to allow for a 
genuineness test.76 However, exercising a 
Treaty right, i.e. working, being self employed, 
being self sufficient or being a student, for over 
three months would arguably be enough to 
show genuine residence. It remains to be seen 
whether the test, which is now binding, will be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
case law of the Court of Justice. 
3.3. Access to welfare 
The habitual residence test has already 
been mentioned; most welfare benefits 
require claimants to be both habitually resi-
dent in the UK and to have the right to live in 
the UK, a condition that is met more easily by 
British citizens than by Union citizens, lead-
ing to infringement proceedings by the Com-
mission. Some recent changes have been put 
in place to reduce further the ability of Union 
citizens to access welfare benefits in the UK 
and further changes are planned.77 It is like-
ly that the compatibility of these with EU law 
will be contested. 
To tie in with the more restrictive defini-
tion of worker discussed above, from 1 Janu-
ary 2014, claimants must have been living in 
the UK for more than three months before 
they can claim income based jobseeker’s 
allowance as they will not be deemed to be 
habitually resident before that time.78 EU cit-
izen jobseekers, even if former workers, will 
have to show that they have a ‘genuine 
prospect of finding work’ to continue to 
receive job seekers allowance, housing bene-
76 O & B v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en 
Asiel C-456/12 [51]. 
77 See Financial Times, 27 November 2013 in which 
David Cameron announced a raft of measures ‘to ensure 
our welfare system is not taken advantage of’. For a more 
detailed analysis of the changes, see Measures to limit 
migrants’ access to benefits, SN/SP/6889. 
78 Jobseeker’s Allowance (Habitual Residence) 
Amendment Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3196). 
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fit, child benefit and child tax credit after six 
months. This is consistent with the new defi-
nition of worker discussed above and will 
come into effect on 1 July 2014.79 More gener-
ally, the habitual residence test is also to be 
applied more rigorously although the test 
itself has not changed, so legislation was not 
considered necessary. Migrants will be 
expected to answer ‘... more individually-tai-
lored questions, provide more detailed 
answers and submit more evidence before 
they will be allowed to make a claim. For the 
first time, migrants will be quizzed about 
what efforts they have made to find work 
before coming to the UK and whether their 
English language skills will be a barrier to 
them finding employment.’80 Additionally, 
EU citizen jobseekers are no longer entitled 
to housing benefit even if they are in receipt 
of jobseeker’s allowance. 
Further restrictions are planned. From 1 
July 2014, new jobseekers arriving in the 
United Kingdom will have to wait three 
months before being able to claim child bene-
fit and child tax credit and the DWP has 
announced that during 2014, the government 
plans to introduce a minimum earnings 
threshold to establish whether a migrant is 
or was in ‘genuine and effective’ work. EU 
migrants will have to show that for the last 
three months, they have been earning at the 
level at which employees start paying nation-
al insurance: £153 or 24 hours a week at 
national minimum wage. The press release 
goes on to state that: ‘An EEA migrant who 
has some earnings but doesn’t satisfy the 
minimum earnings threshold, will  be 
79 Measures to limit migrants’ access to benefits, 
SN/SP/6889, p13. 
80 Department for Work and Pensions press release, 
Improved benefit test for migrants launched, 13 Decem-
ber 2013. Note also that the routine use of interpretation 
services for most new jobseeker allowance claimants 
ended on 9 April 2014 and since 28 April 2014, 
claimants on jobseekers allowance whose spoken Eng-
lish is considered a barrier to them finding work have to 
undertake training to improve their language skills. 
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assessed against a broader range of criteria 
to decide whether they should still be consid-
ered as a worker, or self employed.’81 
3.4. The role of guidance 
Guidance for caseworkers at the Home 
Office in the United Kingdom can be found in 
the European Casework Instructions and in 
the so-called Modernised Guidance.82 Entry 
clearance officers who decide applications 
abroad rely on the chapters dealing with 
European free movement law in the Entry 
Clearance Guidance.83 In principle, these 
give a good indication of how the Home Office 
expects its caseworkers to interpret the law. 
However, guidance does not have the force of 
law and if there is a conflict, the law should 
prevail. The guidance is also significantly out 
of date in terms of reflecting the amendments 
to the Regulations discussed above and the 
most recent case law. Applicants who want to 
understand how the Home Office approaches 
European applications are likely to find that 
it is of limited assistance. 
Although the process of updating the 
guidance and moving them into a uniform 
format in the Modernised Guidance is ongo-
ing, it is an extremely slow process which has 
not been prioritised. The first move across of 
a chapter of the European casework instruc-
81 Department for Work and Pensions press release, 
Minimum earnings threshold for EEA migrants intro-
duced,21 February 2014. 
82 The European Casework Instructions can be 
found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publica-
tions/european-casework-instructions. The Home 
Office is moving towards compiling all its guidance in a 
new document called Modernised Guidance. The Mod-
ernised Guidance can be found here: https://www.gov. 
uk/government/collections/eea-swiss-nationals-and-ec-
association-agreements-modernised-guidance. 
83 The entry clearance guidance relevant to EU 
applications can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/collections/european-nationals-and-schemes-
entry-clearance-guidance. 
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tions to the Modernised Guidance occurred 
on 22 July 2013 (notably it was the chapter 
on the exclusion of European nationals from 
the United Kingdom). The only other chap-
ters out of thirteen which have been trans-
ferred are those setting out a basic introduc-
tion of free movement rights and the chapter 
on family permits. 
In addition to the published guidance, two 
Freedom of Information requests made by 
the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Associa-
t ion in  August  2012 and Apri l  2013,  
unearthed unpublished policy notes known 
as European Operational Policy Notices 
which are brief notes of one or two pages, 
often written in response to new cases as 
guidance for caseworkers.84 These included 
guidance on topics such as Zambrano and 
assessing the genuineness of marriages and 
are in essence the most up to date and useful 
instruments to determine how caseworkers 
will deal with a case. They are also, in reality, 
unavailable to most applicants. 
4. THE ADMINISTRATION OF EEA 
APPLICATIONS 
4.1. Applications from outside the 
United Kingdom 
European applications are made from out-
side the United Kingdom for third country 
nationals to travel to the United Kingdom or 
from within the United Kingdom if the appli-
cant is already here. Surprisingly, the sys-
tems favour those who apply from outside, as 
their applications for so called six month fam-
ily permits are prioritised ahead of applica-
tions to enter the United Kingdom under 
domestic immigration law. There is also no 
84 http://www.ilpa.org.uk/resource/15191/ilpa-to-
uk-border-agency-of-17-august-2012-re-freedom-of-
information-request-european-operational-pdf and-
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/new_euro-
pean_operational_policy#incoming-389475 
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fee payable, unlike applications made from 4.2.1. Forms 
within the United Kingdom which, as dis-
cussed above, are now charged for. 
Procedurally, the process follows that of 
domestic applications. The forms and guid-
ance are therefore geared towards a very 
detailed request for information and fre-
quently ask questions which go beyond those 
that are of relevance to a European family 
member application. Examples of requests 
include information relating to the genuine-
ness of marriages and to criminal convic-
tions.85 This, in turn, leads to some unjustifi-
able refusals with decisions at times showing 
a lack of understanding of the differences 
between domestic and European law. Bio-
metric data is collected for all applications 
made abroad. 
4.2. Applications from within the 
United Kingdom 
European free movement applications 
from within the United Kingdom are dealt 
with by a dedicated department in UK Visas 
and Immigration. The usual applicant is a 
TCN who needs documentation to show that 
he or she can reside and work in the United 
Kingdom. 
Unless the applicant is an Union citizen 
(which is rare as, in practice, Union citizens 
do not need to hold a registration certificate 
in the United Kingdom) the application must 
be made by post. There is no provision for a 
same day service or a priority service 
although this is available for most straight-
forward domestic law applications (admitted-
ly for a large fee). 
85 See correspondence between ILPA and Eddy 
Montgomery, Director of Operations, UK Border Agency 
of 12 May 2010 re application forms and processing 
applications made under European Law. 
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The current form for a Union citizen fami-
ly member applying from within the United 
Kingdom is 37 pages long.86 Although not 
compulsory, the Home Office strongly 
encourages applicants to complete them. It 
not only asks for all the information that may 
be required under European law but also for 
more far reaching information, such as about 
ties to the applicant’s country of birth, in or to 
any country where he has lived for more than 
five years. If the applicant is a student or self 
sufficient, he will be asked for details of his 
comprehensive sickness insurance. 
There is also a request to disclose criminal 
records which initially seemed obligatory but 
has now been prefaced with the caveat: 
Please provide details as requested below of 
any criminal convictions you may have both 
in the UK and overseas. However, please note 
that should you fail to provide this informa-
tion this will not result in the rejection of your 
application. Quite clearly, the expectation is 
that this section will be completed and it is 
unclear how the matter would be dealt with if 
the section were left blank. There is no provi-
sion under European law authorising this 
request. If a member state considers it essen-
tial to ascertain whether a Union citizen or 
family member is a danger to public policy or 
public security, the host member state should 
request the information from the state of ori-
gin of the applicant. 
4.2.2. Delay 
Once the application has been submitted, 
the applicant should be immediately sent a 
certificate of application which, if he is a fam-
ily member, should entitle him to work. This 
is not the case if he falls within the definition 
86 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys-
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/300572/EEA_2_Resi-
dence_Card_04-14.pdf. 
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of other family members, (or as they are 
known in the United Kingdom, extended 
family members) as the Home Office does not 
accept that their rights are directly effective. 
Often these letters take about four weeks to 
send out and recently, there have been 
reports about backlogs with just opening the 
post that the European Directorate in the 
Home Office receives. 
Once submitted, applications regularly 
take longer to be decided than the six month 
deadline imposed by Directive 2004/38. 
Although straightforward applications are 
now dealt with in about two to three months, 
anything which is not a straightforward fam-
ily residence card application routinely takes 
longer. In a letter sent in August 2010 to the 
Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, 
the UK Border Agency stated that only 
78.96% of cases were being dealt with within 
six months. In the past applications appeared 
to be pulled out after about five months wait 
at the Home Office and the applicant would 
be asked for further, usually updating infor-
mation. One can only assume that this was to 
give the impression that matters were being 
dealt with within the absolute deadline. 
This delay causes serious problems for the 
Union citizen and family members. They are 
unable to travel as their passports are with 
the Home Office, are unable to prove their 
right to reside or work and often cannot access 
public services or benefits to which they may 
be entitled. Sanctions on employers who 
employ migrants who do not have the right to 
work mean that family members often have 
difficulty getting and retaining work, particu-
larly before they have been able to secure a 
certificate of application. Although the Home 
Office maintains an employers’ hotline which 
enables employers to check the immigration 
status of a particular employee with the Home 
Office, the information provided is often not 
up to date or accurate. 
These delays also mean that people cannot 
follow what should be the normal procedure 
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of applying for a family permit and then for a 
residence card. To circumvent the delays fac-
ing applications made within the United 
Kingdom, applicants frequently apply for 
family permits from abroad instead of travel-
ling to the United Kingdom and applying for 
a five year residence card. 
It is concerning that there appears to be no 
culture within the Home Office of dealing 
with these applications in a timely way, as 
happens with applications under national 
law. In fact, the Home Office sees the six 
months as a deadline to which it needs to 
work towards rather than as an absolute 
maximum. Such practice is, of course, in con-
tradiction with Article 10 of the Directive, 
which requires a Residence Card to be issued 
no later than six months from the date on 
which they submit the application and a cer-
tificate of application for the residence card to 
be issued immediately. Systems have been 
put in place to try to deal with the delay. One 
such system was the so-called «pre-sift» 
which has been abandoned. The Home Office 
contended that many applications that were 
submitted did not have the required docu-
mentation. They therefore instituted a sys-
tem whereby enclosures were initially 
checked and the application was not logged at 
the Home Office but returned to the appli-
cant if the Home Office did not believe that 
they were complete. The concern was that if 
anything was at all out of the ordinary or a 
document was missing even for a good rea-
son, this was dealt with by returning the 
application so that the clock did not start on 
the six month period. 
4.2.3. Comprehensive sickness 
insurance 
An area of dispute which was raised in the 
infringement proceedings started by the 
Commission in April 2012, and which 
remains unresolved, is the requirement for 
Union citizens who live in the United King-
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dom on the basis of being self-sufficient to 
obtain sickness insurance. The United King-
dom does not consider entitlement to treat-
ment by the National Health Service, the 
public healthcare scheme as sufficient. This 
often has repercussions for those who try to 
obtain permanent residence and retrospec-
tively have to show that they had some form 
of private health insurance throughout their 
period of residence under the Directive. 
4.2.4. Sham marriages 
As mentioned earlier, possible sham mar-
riages are a major policy concern. The 2006 
Regulations exclude anybody who has 
entered a marriage or civil partnership of 
convenience from the definition of spouse or 
civil partner.87 Over the last five years there 
has been an increased emphasis by the Home 
Office on tackling this method of abuse as 
concerns have been voiced both in Parlia-
ment and in the media.88 Generic guidance to 
immigration officers and entry clearance 
posts makes it clear that abuse should be con-
sidered in all applications. In the European 
context, a policy guidance note entitled ‘Sus-
pected marriages/civil partnerships of con-
venience’ advises caseworkers how they 
should assess whether there is a marriage or 
civil partnership of convenience.89 The guid-
ance acknowledges that the burden of prov-
ing that a marriage is one of convenience 
rests with the Home Office and that the stan-
dard of proof is that it must be ‘more likely 
than not’ to be a marriage of convenience. The 
note goes on to set out possible indicators 
87 Regulation 2 of the Immigration (European Eco-
nomic Area) Regulations 2006. 
88 See for example Documents considered by the 
Committee on 22 January 2014 – European Scrutiny 
Committee. 
89 Suspected marriages/civil partnerships of conven-
ience, dated 12 September 2012, issue number 
15/2012, obtained by ILPA after a freedom of informa-
tion request. 
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that a marriage or civil partnership is gen-
uine. These include co-habitation; if not liv-
ing together, daily contact; sharing parental 
responsibility; sharing financial responsibili-
ties; having visited each other’s home country 
and having met each other’s family members 
etc. It then goes on to list factors which may 
indicate a marriage or civil partnership of 
convenience, namely statements by relevant 
parties to this effect; evidence from investiga-
tions being undertaken by relevant authori-
ties; discrepancies in the information provid-
ed or inaccuracies in any accounts given 
about the marriage or civil partnership. If a 
caseworker does suspect a sham marriage, 
they can send out a questionnaire. They can 
also request that the couple attend an inter-
view, a power that is increasingly used. 
Unfortunately, the quality of decisions 
where marriages of convenience have been 
alleged has been very poor. One problem is 
that, in conformity with the government’s 
obligations under the Directive, the applica-
tion form for a family permit does not ask for 
evidence that the relationship is genuine but 
applicants who do not spontaneously provide 
such evidence may have their applications 
refused. So for example, despite the fact that 
the civil partnership certificate of an Irish 
national and his civil partner was submitted 
and no further questions were asked by the 
Home Office, the Home Office refused the 
application stating that they were not satis-
fied that the civil partnership was genuine 
and subsisting, a phrase borrowed from 
domestic immigration control. As the appli-
cant had not submitted his divorce certificate 
which had never been requested, it was 
queried whether he was free to enter into a 
civil partnership and it was also stated that, 
given the different cultural backgrounds of 
the two individuals, they believed that it was 
a civil partnership of convenience.90 The con-
90 The decision was overturned by the First Tier Tri-
bunal on appeal. 
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cern is that the Home Office believe that the 
burden of proof is on the applicant to show 
that he or she is in a genuine marriage rather 
than the Home Office to prove the sham mar-
riage. The approach has been criticised judi-
cially but administrative practice still seems 
to be lagging.91 
There is an obligation in the Immigration 
and Asylum Act 1999, s.24 on marriage regis-
trars to inform the Home Office if they sus-
pect a sham marriage or civil partnership is 
about to take place and this is clearly used as 
the number of reports has been increasing.92 
Given the media attention around EU immi-
gration and the relative ease with which doc-
uments can be obtained for third country 
nationals after a marriage to a Union citizen 
compared to marriage to a British national, 
the Home Office clearly sees this as an area of 
abuse or potential abuse. As discussed earli-
er, the Immigration Act 2014 contains new 
powers to investigate and prevent suspected 
sham marriages before they take place. 
4.2.5. Permanent residence 
Many applicants face their first real diffi-
culties with the Home Office when they make 
an application for permanent residence. The 
Home Office requires very thorough docu-
mentation showing the continuous exercise 
of Treaty rights for five years by the Union 
citizen. Periods of unemployment or failure to 
register with a job centre often cause prob-
lems in showing continuity of residence. If a 
family member wants to rely on the self suffi-
ciency of the Union citizen, proof of compre-
hensive sickness insurance is required. 
91 Papajorgi (EEA spouse – marriage of convenience) 
Greece [2012]UKUT 00038 (IAC)). 
92 Table 5. 4.1 Marriages of convenience in Docu-
ments considered by the Committee on 22 January 2014 
– European Scrutiny Committee: in 2008, there were 
344 reports of sham marriages made by registrars, in 
2012, 1,891 were reported. 
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TCNs who have retained rights after a 
divorce or those who are separated from their 
spouse or civil partner often have particular 
problems proving that they have five years 
continuous residence under the Directive as 
they are reliant on their former partners for 
at least part of this information. There is 
often a narrow view taken of evidence rather 
than a sensible ‘in the round’ approach. 
Despite the fact that the Home Office as a 
government body is in the position of being 
able to make obtain information about tax 
payments from the Inland Revenue to aid an 
applicant, it is a power they use very sparing-
ly, usually only when there has been domes-
tic violence. 
Those exercising derivative rights (outside 
Directive 2004/38) are not considered enti-
tled to permanent residence. This was upheld 
by the Tribunal in Bee in respect of a parent 
who was asserting a right under Chen.93 
5. DOMESTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
The UK’s courts have engaged in many 
aspects of EU free movement rights and a 
good proportion of important CJEU jurispru-
dence (Surinder Singh, Baumbast, Chen, 
Carpenter, McCarthy, Teixeira and Ibrahim, 
Lassal, Rahman, Alarape) originated in the 
UK. As this list suggests, the position of TCN 
family members has been a major issue 
alongside access to services and welfare, 
which often encompass the definitional issue 
of whether an individual has the right to 
reside under the Directive. 
As mentioned above, if an application to be 
recognised as a Union citizen exercising free 
movement rights or a family member is 
refused, the initial appeal is to the Immigra-
tion and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier 
Tribunal. A further appeal lies to the Upper 
93 Bee (permanent/derived rights of residence) 
[2013] UKUT 00083. 
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Tribunal, still within the Immigration and 
Asylum Chamber. Appeals on welfare enti-
tlements are heard in the Social Security 
Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal and in the 
Administrative Chamber of the Upper Tri-
bunal. An appeal on a point of law may then 
be taken from the Upper Chamber to the 
Court of Appeal and from there, in cases of 
public or constitutional importance, to the 
Supreme Court. Until 2009, the Supreme 
Court was known as the Appellate Commit-
tee of the House of Lords (or just House of 
Lords); in this article, unless the context 
requires otherwise,  references to the 
Supreme Court include the House of Lords. 
In practice, it is unusual for a case to proceed 
beyond the Upper Tribunal. Very occasional-
ly, claims may be brought by judicial review 
in the Administrative Court (a division of the 
High Court) but where, as here, appeal rights 
are available, judicial review is not possible. 
The United Kingdom has three different 
legal jurisdictions (England and Wales, Scot-
land, and Northern Ireland; Jersey and the 
other Channel Islands are not part of the 
UK). The Tribunal hears immigration and 
social security appeals in all three. At the 
higher appeal level, there are separate courts 
of appeal (the England and Wales Court of 
Appeal, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ire-
land and the Scottish Court of Session). The 
Supreme Court hears further appeals from 
all three courts. While there are a substantial 
number of Court of Appeal cases on the Direc-
tive, only a very few cases have reached the 
Supreme Court, even taking into account 
that the Court hears fewer than 100 cases per 
year. It may be that lower courts refer diffi-
cult questions of EU law directly to the EU 
Court of Justice via an article 276 reference 
before they reach the Supreme Court. 
All  three systems use common law 
although there is a mixed common/civil law 
system in Scotland. This is significant in two 
main ways. Firstly, the doctrine of precedent 
means that courts are bound by the legal 
principles established in higher courts and, 
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usually, by courts on the same level as them-
selves when hearing similar fact cases. While 
EU law is the superior source of law within 
the UK, the Tribunal must follow the 
Supreme Court’s and Court of Appeal’s inter-
pretations of what that law requires. Some 
key decisions of the Upper Tribunal are also 
binding on both that Tribunal and the First-
tier Tribunal. Judges are therefore con-
strained in how far they may adopt new 
interpretations of EU law. Secondly, the UK 
has a tradition of detailed legislative drafting 
and literal statutory interpretation and it 
has not always been easy for the UK’s courts 
to adjust to the teleological interpretation 
which EU law requires. This is particularly 
so when decisions are made in the Tribunal 
which, as already mentioned, looks at these 
decisions in an immigration context and 
often focuses on implementing legislation 
rather than the Directive. 
This section will consider the major 
domestic jurisprudence thematically. Given 
the large numbers of decisions, this section 
will focus on some selected issues and on the 
most important higher court (Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeal) judgments and will only 
include Tribunal decisions where these are 
recent and deal with issues that have not yet 
come before the higher courts. It is noticeable 
that cases cluster in those areas where there 
is a lack of clarity or certainty in the jurispru-
dence and particularly in cases involving 
TCN family members and/or access to wel-
fare. Some areas which generated many deci-
sions in the past seem now to have been 
largely resolved. For example, there are few 
recent cases on Metock. There is still however 
considerable activity surrounding the princi-
ple in the earlier case of Chen. Other major 
issues in recent years have concerned derived 
rights after Teixeira and Ibrahim, Chen and 
Zambrano, retained rights, permanent resi-
dence and other family members. Although 
cases started to be brought after transposi-
tion in 2006 (and a few cases based on older 
legislation and jurisprudence preceded the 
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Directive), there has been a large increase in man, French and Spanish), earlier EU legis-
the courts’ involvement since 2010. lation and the overall context of the Directive 
5.1. Inclusion within the Directive 
A preliminary question is whether the 
Union citizen in question comes within the 
Directive i.e. is a worker, self-employed, stu-
dent or self-sufficient EU citizen. The mean-
ing of ‘worker’ for the purposes of the Direc-
tive has generated the most claims and most 
commonly arises in the context of a claim for 
welfare support made because work has end-
ed. In determining the answer, the higher 
courts have often immersed themselves in 
the Directive and the Court of Justice 
jurisprudence. For example, in Barry, the 
claimant was a Dutch national who had 
worked for only two weeks in a six month 
period (as a steward at the Wimbledon tennis 
tournament, a post that could only ever be 
temporary).94 The court engaged in depth 
with the European jurisprudence to find that 
Mr Barry’s work, although of short duration, 
made him a worker within the meaning of 
Community law. The courts also took a pur-
posive view in Elmi, recalling that the Direc-
tive was intended «to simplify and strength-
en» the right of free movement.95 In that con-
text, the failure of the government to monitor 
the job-seeking activity of a parent in receipt 
of income support who had declared herself to 
be looking for work could not be used to argue 
that she was no longer a work-seeker under 
the Directive. 
Even or maybe particularly where the 
decision goes against the claimant, the courts 
engage very actively with the meaning of the 
Directive, not the implementing regulations, 
in the context of EU law as a whole. In 
Tilianu, Sedley LJ considered the wording of 
the Directive in three other languages (Ger-
94 Barry v Southwark LBC [2008] EWCA Civ 1440. 
95 Elmi v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2011] EWCA Civ 1403 [22]. 
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to conclude that articles 7(3)(b) and (c) do not 
apply to the self-employed.96 It is not always 
easy however for a court to reach its own con-
clusions. Samin turned on the meaning of 
«temporarily unable to work» under article 
7(3) of the Directive, a term that is not 
defined in the Directive and which has not 
been directly discussed in the Court of Jus-
tice jurisprudence.97 The Court of Appeal was 
bound by two of its own previous decisions, 
which had found that the test is whether 
there is a ‘realistic prospect’ of a return to 
work.98 The Court agreed with its own previ-
ous findings, concluding that they were justi-
fied by the Directive, but, given the doctrine 
of precedent, they had little choice but to do 
so. However, there seems to have been 
enough doubt as to whether this is the correct 
test for permission to be granted for a 
Supreme Court hearing. 
The only Supreme Court case heard in this 
area, St Prix v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, resulted in an article 276 refer-
ence.99 It concerned a woman who was a 
worker under the Directive but who tem-
porarily left the labour market due to preg-
nancy. The question was whether she 
remained a worker under article 7 of the 
Directive even though she was neither under 
a contract of employment nor looking for 
work. The answer, while not explicitly given 
by the Directive, might seem too obvious to 
merit a referral given the objectives of the 
Directive and the clear discrimination 
involved in refusing welfare support in such a 
case. The situation is different to that in 
96 R. (on the application of Tilianu) v Social Fund 
Inspector [2010] EWCA Civ 1397. 
97 Samin v Westminster City Council [2012] EWCA 
Civ 1468 
98 De Brito v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment [2012] EWCA Civ 709; Konodyba v Royal Borough 
of Kensington and Chelsea [2012] EWCA Civ 982. 
99 St Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2012] UKSC 49. 
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Dias, discussed below, which concerned vol-
untary absence from the labour market to 
care for children, a choice that may be made 
by either parent.100 Indeed, the Court seemed 
to be in little doubt of the merits but was 
nonetheless reluctant to act to expand the 
scope of the Directive where this has conse-
quences for the public purse. In any event, 
the Advocate General’s opinion on the case is 
unequivocal. A woman remains a worker 
when she is absent from the labour market 
due to pregnancy and childbirth until such 
time as it is reasonable for her to return to or 
to seek work, a period that must not be short-
er than that granted to citizen women in the 
same situation.101 Consistent with Dias and 
the opinion in Saint Prix, the Upper Tribunal 
has found that, while a woman who leaves 
the job market to look after children is no 
longer a worker, that status may revive if she 
starts looking for work.102 
The analysis however is sometimes more 
superficial. In FK (Kenya) v SSHD, for exam-
ple, a claim was made for permanent resi-
dence based on dependency on a Swiss citizen 
who claimed to be self-sufficient.103 However, 
she was found not to have been self-sufficient 
as she did not have comprehensive medical 
insurance throughout her stay. The issue was 
disposed off briefly, without considering the 
Baumbast decision and related issues of dis-
crimination and proportionality (although 
this may have been because they were not 
argued before the court). The judgment is a 
good example of a case being seen though an 
immigration rather than EU lens. It was an 
appeal on combined EU and article 8 grounds 
made in anticipation of a likely deportation to 
Kenya due to the appellant’s offending. 
100 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Dias 
[2009] EWCA Civ 807. 
101 Case C-507/12 Jessy Saint Prix v Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions, Opinion of Advocate General 
Wahl delivered on 12 December 2013. 
102 Shabani (EEA - jobseekers; nursery education) 
[2013] UKUT 315 (IAC). 
103 FK (Kenya) v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 1302. 
M
IN
IT
ER
IO
 D
E 
EM
PL
EO
 Y
 S
EG
UR
ID
AD
 S
O
CI
AL
The question of health insurance received 
more detailed consideration in Lekpo-Bozua 
where a student had lived in the UK for some 
years with her aunt without medical insur-
ance.104 The case was distinguished from the 
position in Baumbast because here the appel-
lant had been explicitly excluded by the 
terms of the Directive whereas, in Baumbast, 
the claim had been based on the Treaty; the 
question of whether access to NHS care can 
be treated as equivalent to private health 
insurance was not considered.105 Generally, 
and particularly in the Tribunal, absence of 
health insurance is regarded as fatal to a 
claim to be self-sufficient.106 In the Court of 
Appeal, Sedley LJ has questioned whether 
the requirement can be met through access to 
NHS care but this has not been taken up 
more widely.107 The EU Commission also 
seems to be of the view that NHS care meets 
the requirement for comprehensive sickness 
insurance and issued a reasoned opinion on 
the issue in April 2012.108 
5.2. Right to reside 
The application of the right to reside test is 
closely linked to the Directive as the right 
may be established through work, self-
employment, self-sufficiency or study under 
the Directive. As both self-sufficiency and 
study are subject to resources and sickness 
insurance criteria, applicants can find them-
selves in a catch-22: they can only make a 
claim if they are Union citizens exercising 
their free movement rights but the fact of 
making a claim shows that they are not exer-
104 Lekpo-Bozua v Hackney LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 
909 
105 Baumbast v SSHD C-413/99. 
106 See, for example, Zubair (EEA regs: self-employed 
persons) [2013] UKUT 196(IAC) 
107 W(China) v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1494 [26] 
108 European Commission Press release Free move-
ment: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens’ 
rights 26th April 2012. 
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cising their rights in the manner required by 
the Directive. The Court of Justice has found 
that a claim for assistance may indicate that 
the conditions for self-sufficiency have not 
been met but emphasised the need for an 
individualised approach to these cases.109 
The right to reside test was introduced in 
2004 and so predates the Directive. The rele-
vant case law often arises from events before 
the Directive was implemented but decided 
afterwards. In Abdirahman, the Court of 
Appeal found that the test did not breach EU 
law (in its pre-Directive form) and that its 
discriminatory character was justified.110 It 
rejected an argument similar to that eventu-
ally adopted by the Court of Justice (see the 
discussion above) that an individualised deci-
sion must be made about whether rights are 
still being exercised. The right to reside test 
was also upheld by the Court of Appeal in 
Kaczmarek v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions,111 which saw it as consistent with 
the Treaty and justified it by citing a passage 
from the Court of Justice case of Trojani: 
So long as social security systems have not 
been harmonised in terms of the level of 
benefits, there remains a risk of social 
tourism, ie moving to a Member State with 
a more congenial social security environ-
112ment.
The most important decision, Patmalniece, 
also arose outside the Directive and concerned 
eligibility for a pension credit that had a right 
to reside requirement.113 The main issue was 
not whether the appellant had a right to 
109 See, for example, Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v 
Peter Brey, C- 140/12. 
110 Abdirahman v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2007] EWCA Civ 657. 
111 Kaczmarek v Secretary of State for Work and Pen-
sions [2008] EWCA Civ 1310. 
112 Trojani v Centre Public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles 
(Case C-456/02) [2004] ECR I-7573 [18]. 
113 Patmalniece v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2011] UKSC 11. 
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reside as it was accepted that she did not but 
whether the right to reside criterion is dis-
criminatory on the grounds of nationality. 
The Supreme Court found that the condition 
discriminates indirectly but that it is justi-
fied. Clearly, the European Commission dis-
agrees (see the discussion above). 
Workers who are subject to transitional 
measures will only be regarded as having the 
right to reside if they comply with the 
requirements of that regime (which must, 
however, be proportionate). Zalewska found 
that a Polish worker who had failed to regis-
ter her employment, as required by the tran-
sitional arrangements, was not entitled to 
income support.114 Similarly, late registra-
tion does not have retrospective effect.115 
Transitional arrangements interact with 
national immigration laws as they do not 
apply to those who had been working lawful-
ly for 12 months or longer at the time of acces-
sion. However, an asylum seeker permitted 
to work while on temporary admission (toler-
ated presence) and an overstayer not 
expressly prohibited from working could not 
take advantage of the derogation.116 
5.3. Marriage of Convenience 
As reported elsewhere in this article, the 
marriage of convenience has become a major 
preoccupation. The Upper Tribunal in Papa-
jorgi found that the officials cannot routinely 
require applicants to show that their mar-
riage is genuine but only to do so if evidence is 
present to suggest that this is not the case.117 
The protections in articles 27 and 28 do not 
114 Zalewska (AP) v Department for Social Develop-
ment (Northern Ireland) [2008] UKHL 67. 
115 Szpak v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2013] EWCA Civ 46. 
116 Miskovic v Secretary of State for Work and Pen-
sions [2011] EWCA Civ 16. 
117 Papajorgi (EEA spouse – marriage of convenience) 
Greece [2012] UKUT 00038 (IAC). 
86 REVISTA DEL MINISTERIO DE EMPLEO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 110 
TQXQZM,c^Me,mzp,MXU_[Z,TaZ`Q^ 
apply to a decision to withdraw a residence More often, the question has arisen in 
document on the grounds that it  was 
obtained through an abuse of rights under 
article 35 (a marriage of convenience).118 
5.4. Permanent residence 
An innovation of the Directive was the 
right to permanent residence if the EU citi-
zen and their family members who live with 
him or her who have «resided lawfully» for 
five years in the member state.119 The mean-
ing of «resided lawfully» and other aspects of 
the right to permanent residence have been 
the subject of significant litigation, although 
some clarification has now been provided by 
the Court of Justice in a series of references 
mainly from the UK.120 
The recent Court of Justice decision in 
Onuekwere has settled the question of 
whether time spent in prison counts towards 
permanent residence, confirming the view in 
C v SSHD that it does not.121 However, it did 
not address all issues and some of the find-
ings of the Upper Tribunal in Essa remain 
relevant, notably that periods of wrongful 
detention, pre-trial remand (leading to 
acquittal or non-custodial sentence), or immi-
gration detention may count.122 If there have 
been periods of absence, they must be for rea-
sons comparable in importance to those in 
article 16(3) of the Directive; however, that 
list is not exhaustive.123 
118 TC (Kenya) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2008] EWCA Civ 543. 
119 Article 16. 
120 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Dias C-
325/09; Ziolkowski v Land Berlin C-424/10); Alarape v 
SSHD C-529/1; Onuekwere v SSHD C-378/12. 
121 C v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 1406. 
122 Essa (EEA: rehabilitation/integration) [2013] 
UKUT 00316 (IAC) 
123 Babajanov (Continuity of residence - Immigration 
(EEA) Regulations 2006) [2013] UKUT 513 (IAC). 
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relation to access to welfare. Two of the earli-
est cases, Lassal and Dias led to article 276 
referrals.124 They concerned Union citizens 
from France and Portugal respectively, both 
of whom claimed income support. The issue 
in Lassal was whether a period of five years 
that was completed before the date of trans-
position gave a right to permanent residence. 
Dias concerned a Portuguese national who, 
over the course of many years residence in 
the UK, had stopped work at various 
moments to care for her children, thus inter-
rupting the accumulation of five years’ con-
tinuous residence as a worker. It asked 
whether time spent not working or self-suffi-
cient but in possession of a residence permit 
before transposition of the Directive counted 
towards the five years needed for permanent 
residence under the Directive or, if not, if 
there was a right to permanent residence 
arising from art 18 TFEU. Even before guid-
ance from the Court of Justice in these cases 
and also in Alarape was available however,125 
the Court of Appeal found that ‘residing 
legally’ means residing in accordance with 
the terms of the Directive, as indicated in 
recital 17 of the preamble, dismissing claims 
based on article 18 TFEU.126 This could have 
some hard outcomes; a bereaved father and 
children who had residence permits but could 
not comply with the conditions of article 12 of 
the Directive did not qualify for permanent 
residence.127 This was especially harsh for 
the father who was not a Union citizen. 
TCNs (from Nigeria) were the appellants 
also in Amos.128 Here the issue was that, as 
124 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Lassal 
[2009] EWCA Civ 157; Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions v Dias [2009] EWCA Civ 807. 
125 Alarape v SSHD C-529/110. 
126 McCarthy v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 641; Lekpo-
Bozua v London Borough of Hackney[2010] EWCA Civ 
909. 
127 Okafor v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 499. 
128 Amos v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 552. 
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separated spouses, they were unable to estab-
lish that the Union citizen spouse had been 
exercising rights under the Directive after 
separation but before the divorce (it was 
acknowledged that there was no need to show 
exercise of rights after divorce). The Court of 
Appeal found that there was no obligation on 
the government, who would have access to the 
relevant records, to assist in this regard. It is 
interesting that, in this case involving TCNs, 
the Court made its decision by reference to 
the implementing regulations rather than the 
Directive (even though the original legal sub-
missions had referred to the Directive). 
This decision has not helped with the seri-
ous practical difficulties spouses may face 
after separation. However, the Upper Tri-
bunal has found that government should not 
ask for evidence of work throughout the 
entire period of residence as status of worker 
may be retained without continuous work, 
and must be careful to stay within the law in 
terms of documentary requirements.129 
«Residing with» for the purposes of perma-
nent residence also does not have to mean 
cohabitation (although see now the Court of 
Justice in Onuekwere).130 
5.5. Other family members 
There have been several cases on the 
meaning and entitlements of ‘other family 
members’ under article 3(2) of the Directive. 
They are controversial because ‘other family 
members’ includes TCN relatives who have 
few opportunities of being admitted under 
domestic law and because the Directive 
leaves some discretion to member states in 
deciding whether to admit. Some of these 
129 Samsam (EEA: Revocation and retained rights) 
Syria [2011] UKUT 00165 (IAC); Barnett and others (EEA 
Regulations: rights and documentation) [2012] UKUT 
00142 
130 PM (EEA – spouse – «residing with») Turkey [2011] 
UKUT 89 (IAC); Onuekwere v SSHD Case C-378/12. 
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issues have now been resolved by the Court of 
Justice judgment in Rahman.131 
The issue of the timing and place of 
dependency was much contested. The pre-
Metock case of KG (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA 
Civ 13 established that ‘the country from 
which [the applicants] have come’ does not 
need to be an EEA state (as the implementing 
regulations then required) provided the par-
ties were in the same state immediately prior 
to the move, thus excluding family members 
who entered the UK ahead of the Union citi-
zen. The underlying immigration anxieties 
are clear in the judgment. Both the appel-
lants were irregular migrants whose entry to 
the UK predated the movement of the Union 
citizen in question. Reference was made 
(twice) to the fourteen relatives in Sri Lanka 
who might follow if the claim succeeded (even 
though, on the facts, they were unlikely to 
have met either the dependency or household 
criterion of article 3(2)). There was a detailed 
exposition of the purpose of the Directive, 
which is to enable the movement of Union cit-
izens, not family reunification except insofar 
as it facilitates that purpose. 
The judgment in Metock came shortly 
afterwards but the Court of Appeal did not 
consider that it changed the position.132 How-
ever, some adjustment was needed after Rah-
man was decided by the Court of Justice. The 
2013 case of Aladeselu determined that, 
while the relative must have been dependent 
in the country from which they come, that is 
a reference to their own country of residence 
which need not be the same as that in which 
the Union citizen had resided. Further, pro-
vided there is still dependency at the date of 
the application, a relative who has been 
dependent throughout may still qualify if he 
arrives in the host Member State before the 
131 SSHD v Rahman Case C-83/11.
 
132 Bigia v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] EWCA Civ
 
79. 
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Union citizen.133 However, the Court of 
Appeal has upheld the view that dependency 
must have existed in another state; depend-
ency (or household membership) which arises 
only after entry to the UK does not fall with-
in article 3(2).134 This point is now the subject 
of infringement proceedings by the Commis-
sion.135 
Dependency (or household membership) 
must relate only to the Union citizen them-
selves, not their spouse.136 However, it does 
not need to be a dependency of necessity 
although mere presence without permission 
to work does not, on its own, establish 
dependency.137 If a residence card has been 
issued in error, it may be revoked.138 
5.6. Derived rights 
Chen is another Court of Justice decision 
which had the potential to undermine nation-
al controls and anxiety about this may be 
detected in the domestic case law. The first 
case to be determined by the Court of Appeal 
after the decision, W (China), decided before 
transposition of the Directive, mentions the 
illegality of the parents’ entry both to the UK 
and Ireland (where their child was born) and 
their failed asylum claim in the opening 
paragraph.139 However, in this case, there 
was an absence of sickness insurance and 
sufficient resources. The availability of free 
NHS care was not regarded as meeting that 
requirement so far as the parents were con-
cerned. The court was unanimous in finding 
that the parents lacked resources because, 
133 Aladeselu v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 144. 
134 Oboh (Nigeria) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 1525. 
135 European Commission Press release Free move-
ment: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens’ 
rights 26th April 2012. 
136 Soares v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 575. 
137 Lim (EEA -dependency) [2013] UKUT 437 (IAC); 
Reyes (EEA Regs: dependency) [2013] UKUT 314 (IAC). 
138 Sannie v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 1638. 
139 W (China) v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1494. 
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although they were working, this was unlaw-
ful; there was no obligation on the govern-
ment to permit the parents to work in order 
to fulfil the Chen requirements. Permission 
to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. 
Liu also betrayed anxiety about the immigra-
tion implications of Chen. Buxton LJ said 
openly that, were it not for the obligation to 
comply with the judgment in Chen, he might 
regard the decision to give birth in Ireland 
solely in order to gain EU citizenship for the 
child as an abuse of rights.140 In any event, 
the resources requirement was not fulfilled 
by parents working under temporary leave 
that would terminate upon the grant of a 
right of residence to the child. The terms of 
the judgment made it clear that the principle 
of Chen would only be applied when all the 
conditions of that case were met. The Tri-
bunal later found that there was a right 
under EU law to enter the UK as well as to 
remain in order to fulfil Chen rights.141 The 
Zambrano decision was a further blow and 
working was permitted from July 2012. 
The Zambrano line of decisions does not 
concern the Directive but Article 20 of the 
Treaty but it is regarded as part of the 
panoply of free movement rights. The Court 
of Appeal in Pryce established that Zambra-
no created a directly effective right on people 
already living in the UK.142 The Upper Tri-
bunal found that the Zambrano principle 
could be relied upon by a parent or other pri-
mary carer living outside the EU in order to 
accompany the Union citizen child to their 
country of nationality.143 The principle 
applies even if the child is not a UK national 
if the effect of the decision would be that child 
must leave the EU.144 In the context of crimi-
140 Liu v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 1275 
141 M (Chen Parents: source of rights) Ivory Coast 
[2010]UKUT 227 (IAC). 
142 Pryce v Southwark LBC [2012] EWCA Civ 1572. 
143 MA and SM (Zambrano: EU children outside EU) 
Iran [2013] UKUT 00380 (IAC). 
144 Ahmed (Amos; Zambrano; reg 15A(3)(c) 2006 
EEA Regs) 2013: UKUT 00089 (IAC). 
REVISTA DEL MINISTERIO DE EMPLEO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 110 89 
Q_`aPU[_ 
nal deportation, the Court of Appeal found 
that the principle applied only to situations 
in which the Union citizen would be forced to 
leave the EU so could not exercise their citi-
zenship rights, not where the enjoyment of 
rights would be diminished by departure.145 
A desire to ensure that the boundaries of 
derived rights are not wider than required by 
the Court of Justice jurisprudence is visible 
in a Court of Appeal case dealing with the 
impact of the Ibrahim and Teixeira deci-
sions.146 Again, while these are based not on 
the Directive but on Article 10 Regulation 
492/2011 (formerly Article 12 Regulation 
1612/68), they come under the umbrella of 
free movement rights. Here, the only period 
of employment between 1999 and 2010 was a 
part-time (8 hours per week) post held for 10 
weeks. A period spent job-seeking was found 
not to count towards the status of worker for 
the purposes of Article 12 of the Regulation 
even if it might under the Directive. The 
Court of Appeal considered it arguable that, 
given the heavy obligations that the Regula-
tion creates, the test of being a worker should 
be more demanding than under the Directive. 
However, that point had already been ceded 
by the government. Even so, the period of 
employment here was regarded as too mini-
mal to engage rights whether under the 
Directive or the Regulation. Looking at the 
evidence as a whole, including only token 
efforts at job-seeking through the period, res-
idence had not been for the purpose of exer-
cising a right to work. 
The boundaries of ‘education’ have also 
been explored in the domestic case law. While 
the Court of Justice has confirmed that, 
dependent on the facts, the derived right of 
residence might continue after a child enters 
higher education, the Upper Tribunal 
inclined to the view that there is no lower age 
limit but did not need to reach a view or make 
145 Harrison v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 1736. 
146 MDB (Italy) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 1015. 
M
IN
IT
ER
IO
 D
E 
EM
PL
EO
 Y
 S
EG
UR
ID
AD
 S
O
CI
AL
a referral in order to determine the case 
before it.147 
5.7. Exclusion of EU citizens 
The final issue considered is deportation. 
This is another problematic area in which 
immigration concerns can easily intrude. As 
mentioned earlier in this article, the ability to 
deport foreign national prisoners has become 
a major political issue in the UK and the gov-
ernment has sought to maximise its power to 
deport despite human rights and EU norms. 
Despite this, the Court of Appeal has upheld 
the necessity of observing the Directive’s 
requirements for an assessment of whether 
the individual’s personal conduct represents a 
genuine, present and sufficiently serious 
threat as required by article 27(2) of the Direc-
tive.148 The Court of Justice decision in ZZ 
(France) means that deportees in national 
security cases must be informed of the ‘essence 
of the grounds’ on which the decision had been 
made, a requirement that could not be yielded 
to national security concerns.149 However, 
detention pending deportation is permitted 
provided it conforms to the requirements in 
the Directive although damages are payable 
for unlawful detention.150 
The Court of Justice’s decision in MG sup-
ports the domestic decision in HR (Portugal) 
which found that time spent in prison does 
not count for the purpose of enhancing the 
level of protection against expulsion under 
article 28 of the Directive.151 However, the 
147 Alarape v SSHD C-529/11; Shabani (EEA - job-
seekers; nursery education) [2013] UKUT 315 (IAC). 
148 BF (Portugal) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2009] EWCA Civ 923. 
149 ZZ (France) v SSHD C-300/11; ZZ (France) v 
SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 7. 
150 R. (on the application of Nouazli) v SSHD [2013] 
EWCA Civ 1608; R. (on the application of MK (Algeria)) v 
SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 980. 
151 SSHD v MG C-400/12; HR (Portugal) v SSHD 
[2009] EWCA Civ 371. 
90 REVISTA DEL MINISTERIO DE EMPLEO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 110 
TQXQZM,c^Me,mzp,MXU_[Z,TaZ`Q^ 
enhanced protection conferred by ten years’ 
residence prior to conviction is not automati-
cally lost upon imprisonment although the 
prison sentence would be one factor in deter-
mining the degree of integration and thus 
whether the restrictive criteria for expulsion 
are met as at the date of decision. «Impera-
tive grounds of public security» require a 
finding that the person concerned represents 
a «genuine and present threat to the funda-
mental interests of society or of the Member 
State concerned». Previous criminal convic-
tions and «considerations of general preven-
tion» cannot, without more, justify expulsion 
on these grounds.152 
5.8. Discussion of domestic 
jurisprudence 
The domestic case law shows serious 
engagement by the courts with the rights 
contained in the Directive as well as the 
derived rights that exist outside it. There are 
many examples of closely reasoned decisions 
that aim to give full effect to rights even if 
that means some incursion into national 
immigration control. However, some deci-
sions are placed more firmly than others in 
an immigration context. This is particularly 
likely when derived rights or other family 
members are in question as their ambit is 
less certain than the main rights under the 
Directive and they are most often utilised by 
those who cannot qualify under national 
laws. Sometimes, this concern is expressed 
openly. On other occasions, it is detectable 
through the language used or the way the 
decision is framed with the primary issue 
being the status as migrant rather than the 
EU law rights. When discussing cases with 
an immigration component, the courts seem 
more likely to refer to the implementing reg-
ulations rather than the Directive, a way of 
distancing the discussion from fundamental 
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EU principles. These decisions are less likely 
to engage not only with the Directive but with 
the legal context in which the Directive sits. 
The discussion here has focused on the high-
er courts with some cases taken from the 
Upper Tribunal; it is likely that this tenden-
cy is even more marked in the Lower Tri-
bunal.153 
6. CONCLUSION 
Since 2006, there has been widespread 
concern expressed by some politicians and 
media about the number of migrants enter-
ing the United Kingdom and the United 
Kingdom’s lack of control over European free 
movement rights. This, alongside gener-
alised distrust in the United Kingdom of the 
European Union, has had a visible effect on 
implementation of free movement law. 
Amendments to the Regulations have largely 
been forced on successive governments by 
jurisprudence of the CJEU. Although these 
have forced the Home Office to accept a 
widening of European free movement law in 
some areas as discussed above, they have 
been accepted begrudgingly and as narrowly 
as possible. No doubt many of these amend-
ments will lead to litigation in the future. The 
higher courts have generally done their best 
to ensure that rights are given effect but, in 
some instances, a fear about the immigration 
consequences of EU rights and a leaning 
towards approaches adopted from domestic 
immigration are visible. 
The political dimension should not be 
underestimated. The current government 
has adopted a target-driven approach to its 
aim of reducing the number of migrants 
entering the UK. The general negative rheto-
ric about immigrants and about EU migra-
tion in particular does seem to have affected 
the administrative practice. The quality of 
152 SSHD v FV (Italy) [2012] EWCA Civ 1199. 153 Shaw, Miller and Fletcher n. 6, 44-45. 
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decision making and lack of communication 
is of major concern. The result is that appli-
cations are wrongly refused and have to be 
appealed. Concern about abuse seems to 
have intensified leading to tightened domes-
tic provisions on applications based on rela-
tionships and there are far more widespread 
allegations of sham marriages with corre-
sponding refusals. It often appears that the 
correct burden of proof is not applied so that 
applicants are expected to show that the mar-
riage is genuine, reversing the burden of 
proof. Meanwhile, concerns about ‘benefits 
tourism’ have made access to services and 
benefits much more difficult. 
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The Directive aims to facilitate the free 
movement of people and contrasts with the 
much more state-centred restrictive and pre-
scriptive orientation of domestic immigration 
law. It therefore poses a particular challenge 
to government and the courts. It seems likely 
that continuing litigation on a case by case 
basis, some pressure, albeit limited, on the 
United Kingdom government by the Commis-
sion and a general concern in the United 
Kingdom about numbers of migrants, cou-
pled with scepticism about the European 
Union, will continue to shape the application 
of the Directive in the United Kingdom for 
the foreseeable future. 
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ABSTRACT	 This article analyses the transposition of Directive 2004/38 into the British legal system. 
Firstly, it summarises the historical, political and legal context. Then, it explains how the 
Directive has been implemented, the administrative practice in its application and the 
response of the British courts. 
Keywords: free movement of EU workers, family members, reunification, access to bene-
fits, British judicial decisions. 
RESUMEN	 Este artículo analiza la adaptación de la Directiva 2204/38 en el sistema legal británico. 
Aborda en una primera parte una sintésis del contexto histórico, político y legal para pa-
sar a explicar cómo se ha implementado la Directiva, la prática administrativa en su apli-
cación y la respuesta de los tribunales británicos. 
Palabras clave: Libre circulación de trabajadores de la UE, miembros de la familia, rea-
grupamiento, acceso beneficios, decisiones judiciales británicas. 
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